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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and
through its ROAD COMMISSION,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.

v.

10902

STYLE-CRETE, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR
REHEARING AND SUPPORTING BRIEF

PETITION FOR REHEARING
The State of Utah, plaintiff and appellant herein,
respectfully petitions the court for a rehearing on the
following grounds:
1. The court's decision treats issues of fact as if

they were issues of law.
1

2. The effect of the decision was to deprive the

State of the right to introduce evidence as to comparability.

3. The decision fails to clarify the law relating to
the effect of availability of other property and will tend
to encourage future litigation.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
NATURE OF CASE
This was an appeal from a judgment in consolidated condemnation proceedings. The primary issue on
appeal was the right of the State to introduce evidence
that other property was available to replace all or part
of that severed by the condemnation and construction
of the improvement.
DISPOSITION ON APPEAL
This court held that evidence of the availability
of other property was properly rejected by the trial
court because the property was not "comparable" and
would not be a "useable substitute."
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the trial of
great emphasis on the
of property lying east
(Parcel "C"), because

this case the condemnee
fact that an 8.262-acre
of the new 23rd West
of the elevation of the

2

placed
parcel
Street
street,

could not be used with the remaining property upon
which a pre-cast concrete plant was located (Parcel
"B").
There was other testimony that damage would
result to the property because of the severance of a
.53-acre parcel of property lying to the south of the
concrete plant and fronting on 5th South Street (Parcel
"A").
It was never seriously urged at the trial, in
the briefs, or in the argument on appeal that severance
of Parcel "A" from the concrete plant would, in itself,
be sufficient to require the condemnee to abandon its
p~operty as an industrial or a pre-cast concrete manufacturing site. There was testimony that because of
the severance of Parcel "C" from the concrete plant,
the curing area would be too small, and Parcel "B"
would be of such size that it could no longer be used
for any other types of manufacturing.

In this context, the state sought to introduce evidence that Arnold Machinery Company owned and
would have sold a parcel of property lying west of the
plant site which was comparable in size, soil, and topography to severed Parcel "C". In its decision, however,
the court compared the Arnold Machinery Company
property with Parcel "A" rather than Parcel "C'', and
held that it is not comparable because a IO-acre triangular piece would not effectively substitute for the
one-half acre piece severed by the railroad right-of-way.
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ARGUMENT

I
The court's decision treats issues of fact as if they
were issues of law.
One of the primary problems facing litigants in
condemnation cases i.s to determine, in addition to the
value of property taken, the extent to which the taking
and construction of the improvement affects values of
remaining property. One of the factors to be taken into
account by a jury is the availability of comparable
property to replace that severed. The question of "comparability" like the question of "availability", is one
of fact, to be determined on the basis of evidence. The
facts represent a portion of the full and complete
inquiry necessary to determine the condemnee' s damages insofar as they are reflected in the costs of "rehabilitation, rearrangement, restoration, and readjustment"
of the remaining property. As pointed out in State
Highway Commission v. Hayes Estate, 140 N.W.2d
680 ( S.D., 1966) :

"In estimating damages to the remainder, or
in other words, the depreciation in value of the
part not taken, the land owner is entitled to have
the jury appraised as to all those facts which
legitimately bear upon the market value * * *
before and after the taking, and those factors
that would ordinarily influence a prospective
customer in negotiating for the property.

" * * * it is proper to take into consideration
the expenses made necessary by the improvement * * * in order to restore the land to its most
4

advantageous use, or in adjusting it to the
changed conditions brought about by the taking

* * *"

That the question of comparability is a fact issue
is well recognized by the authorities and the cases. We
have been unable to find any cases in which it has
seriously been contended that these are law questions
to be decided by the court without evidence. See Pima
County et al. v. De Concini et ux., 79 Ariz. 154, 285
P .2d 609, 6 l l ( 1955), and the other authorities cited
in the appellant's reply brief in this case.
The court has assumed, absent any evidence, that
a triangular "?arcel of property is not comparable to
· an adjacent square parcel of similar size, soil, and
topography. The court may not take judicial notice of
this kind of a fact (78-25-1 Utah Code Annotated
1953).
We submit that the question of comparability is a
fact question, to be determined on the basis of evidence
submitted to the trial court. Only when evidence as to
comparability and the effect of the availability of other
land upon the market price is given a full consideration
can the parties be deemed to have had a fair trial on
issues fairly made.

II
The effect of the decision was to deprive the state
of the right to introduce evidence as to comparability.
The condemnee's case at the trial included the
theory that great damages resulted from the fact that
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Parcel "C" was separated from Parcel "B" by the
slightly elevated 23rd West Street, and that because
of this, the property north of the plant would be too
small to support a pre-cast concrete or any other manufacturing operation.
In cross examining McCowan Edward Hunt, an
expert in concrete manufacturing, counsel for the State
attempted to go into the question of camparability of
the Arnold Machinery Company property with the
property identified as Parcel "C". The following
occurred at page 456 of the record:
"Q. The third [factor}, as I understand, would
be-well, from here, would be the construction
of this road, which prevents access into the east
portion for storage?
A. Yes, eliminates their storage and, of course,
impedes their-the bad thing about it, these people are handling heavy loads and frequently
some, a trailer load, that is maneuvering in this
limited space as I see it is very difficult.
Q. You've been on this property a number of
times, haven't you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are you familiar with the property that lies
on the west of Style-Crete's property and between their boundary and the surplus canal?
A. Yes, sir. I have seen it.
Q. Now, from an engineering standpoint,
would that property be a satisfactory substitute
for the property on the east?
.l\IR. CAMPBELL: Ob;ection, if the court
please. That has nothing to do with any issue
6

before the court. Engineering wise or market
value wise.

MR. ROE: I'll submit it. We've already
argued this a little to Your Honor, so, you know
what the position is, I think.
MR. CAMPBELL: The question was, Your
Honor, whether the land to the west would be
as functional, as I understand the question of
counsel, that the land to the west would be as
functional and the use ofthe plant of StyleCrete as the property that is to the east of 2300
West. And there is no law in this jurisdiction
that can possibly require a citizen to go out and
buy other land. And in attempt to repair and
substitute the damage which the government or
the state has occurred. * * *
THE COURT: Objection will be sustained.
The basis is at this point there has been
no showing of availability of land on the west
side" (emphasis added).

***

It will be seen that the state attempted to inquire
into the comparability of the Arnold Machinery Company property, and the extent to which the problems
described by witness Hunt might be cured by the acquisition of that property. The trial court refused to permit
evidence of the availability of other property, ostensibly on th eground that there had been no evidence
that other property was available (although objection
was based upon the ground that this was not material,
because there was no duty to acquire property).

Nevertheless, when the state attempted to introduce
evidence respecting the availability of other property
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the trial court excluded it on the ground that the evidence was not material. Then came the decision of the
court, holding that evidence of the availability of other
property was properly excluded because the property
was not comparable. Understandably, the representatives of the state feel as if they were caught in a revolving door.
III
The decision fails to clarify the law relating to the
effect of availability of comparable property and will
encourage future litigation.
The court's decision, by holding in substance that
the question of comparability of property can be determined by the court without the introduction of evidence,
tended to obscure an important legal principle. Both
condemnors and condemnees should be given some
guidance as to the factors properly to be considered
in determining severance damages. As it stands, the
decision in this case is likely to lead to an inability on
the part of the condemnor and the condemnee to reach
any agreement upon such damages. Surely additional
litigation and guesswork will follow.
Depite the trial court's deaf ear, perhaps it can be
urged that the failure of the state to prove that the
property was comparable, or to continue to make offers
of proof in connection with it, the error in rejection
of the evidence was "harmless." But if this is the case,
it would be beneficial to all concerned if the court
would say so, instead of leaving an important principle
under a decisional cloud.
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CONCLUSION
In this case the trial court was unduly restrictive in
the scope of permitted cross examination, and though
not assigned M such, the refusal to permit complete
testing of the factors upon which opinions of the condemnee's experts were based was error. Possibly the
error originally was not fundamental; but when the
court refused evidence of comparability and availability,
it effectively deprived the state of an opportunity to
pove that the condemnee did not suffer the damage
claimed.
In its decision on appeal this court mistakenly
assumed that the property was meant as a substitute
for Parcel "A"; and determined the question of comparability without benefit of evidence.
A rehearing should be granted, the judgment of
the trial court reversed, and the case remanded for a
new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
BRYCE E. ROE
Special Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant
510 American Oil Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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